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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOLBROOK COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STANLEY S. ADAMS, VON H. 
WHITBY, TONY M. WAND, a part-
nership, d/b/a THE EXCHANGE, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No, 
14005 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
* * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
On November 1, 1974, plaintiff sued the defendants as a 
partnership doing business as "The Exchange,11 for the reasonable 
value of materials furnished and labor performed upon real property 
leased by the defendants. The Complaint stated two claims for re-
lief, one pursuant to Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
and the other in quantum meruit. 
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants as a partnership 
had an interest in land at the time a contract to improve their 
leasehold interest was entered into. The defendants denied the 
allegation in a verified motion to dismiss wherein it was stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. That they were not, nor had ever been a partnership, 
a joint venture or a d/b/a; 
2. That they had never done business as The Exchange; 
3. That The Exchange was a non-profit corporation; and 
4. That the defendants individually had never contracted 
with plaintiff or with anyone. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The parties supplemented the pleadings with affidavits 
and exhibits and a hearing was held. The trial court dismissed 
the Complaint and action as to the three defendants/ determined 
that The Exchange Place Social Association, a non-profit corpor-
ation was the "proper defendant" and granted plaintiff 10 days 
to refile its action. From a final order or judgment of dismis-
sal in favor of the defendants, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the final order of the lower 
court and a determination by this Court that its Complaint states 
a claim upon which relief can be granted and that genuine issues 
of material fact exist. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In January, 1973, in company with Dan Losee, an archi-
tect who had been employed by Stanley Adams, Ben Holbrook, Presi-
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dent of Holbrook Company, plaintiff, visited the Intermountain 
Stock Exchange Building at the invitation of Mr. Losee for the 
purpose of discussing a contract for remodeling the premises for 
a business for defendant Adams. (R. 12) 
In February, 1973, at the invitation of Raymond Jones, 
an architect employed by defendant Adams, Mr. Holbrook again 
visited the said premises for the purpose of determining needed 
remodeling on said business. (R. 12) The Complaint alleges that 
the premises which were visited by Mr. Holbrook and the architects 
is commonly known as 39 Exchange Place, and that the defendants 
had a leasehold interest in said real property. (R. 1) The certi-
ficate of doing business under an assumed name lists the defendants 
as doing business as The Exchange, which is located at 39 Exchange 
Place. (R. 37) 
After said February visit, Holbrook Company was in-
structed by architect Jones to proceed with the design of the 
project and time was accrued to the job prior to the commencement 
of construction in May of 1973. (R. 13) 
The Exchange Place Social Association filed Articles of 
Incorporation with the Secretary of State and was incorporated on 
May 4, 1973. (R. 29) On May 9, 1973, a certificate was filed with 
the Secretary of State wherein Stanley S. Adams, as trustee, certified 
that Stanley S. Adams, Von H. Whitby, and Tony M. Wand were carrying 
on, conducting or transacting business under an assumed name of The 
Exchange. (R. 36 & 37) 
3 
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The Complaint alleges that plaintiff completed its con-
tract and was not paid the reasonable value of labor performed and 
materials supplied to said real property. The Complaint further 
alleges that the defendants are partners, that they were doing 
business as The Exchange, that they contracted to have the build-
ing altered or repaired, that they did not post a bond to insure 
that plaintiff would be paid, and that they should therefore be held 
personally liable as provided in Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. (R. 1 & 2) 
Prior to the hearing of defendants1 motion to dismiss, 
the record was supplemented with the affidavit of plaintiffs 
President, setting forth the facts aforesaid. (R. 12 & 13) At 
the time of the hearing, plaintiff further supplemented the record 
by introducing a copy of a certificate of doing business under an 
assumed name filed with the Secretary of State on May 9, 1973. (R. 
36 & 37) The defendants also offered into evidence a copy of the 
Articles of Incorporation of The Exchange Place Social Association, 
(R. 29-33) and a copy of the certificate regarding doing business 
under an assumed name filed December 7, 1974. (R. 34-35) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM AGAINST THESE 
DEFENDANTS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
In order for a complaint to state a claim for relief 
under Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it, " . . . shall 
4 
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contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment 
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." These basic 
requirements are to advise the opponent and the court of the 
issues raised, Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275, 
277 (1960), and are restricted to the task of general notice-giving. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(a); Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 
2d 157, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955). 
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges facts constituting a 
short and plain statement of a claim either under Section 14-2-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or in quantum meruit. The essential 
allegations supporting either claim are: (1) that the defendants 
are partners doing business as The Exchange, 39 Exchange Place; 
(2) that the defendants are owners of a leasehold interest in real 
property at said location; (3) that the defendant Stanley S. Adams 
entered into a contract of $500.00 or more to construct, add to, 
alter or repair said property; (4) that defendants failed to post 
a bond as required by Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; . 
(5) that plaintiff furnished materials and performed labor on said 
property; (6) that plaintiff has not been paid the reasonable value 
thereof; and (7) that defendants will be unjustly enriched if plain-
tiff is not paid. Clearly, two alternate claims showing the pleader 
is entitled to relief are stated in plaintiff's Complaint. 
5 
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Plaintiff submitted an affidavit and other evidence which 
substantiates the aforesaid claims. The affidavit of plaintiff's 
President shows that Stanley S. Adams, through his architect, con-
tracted to have said property altered or improved. Furthermore, 
the affidavit points out that said contract was entered into and 
services were accrued to the job prior to the date of incorporation 
of The Exchange Place Social Association. (R. 12 & 13) The certi-
ficate of assumed name filed May 9, 1973, further supports the Com-
plaint's allegations that the defendants were doing business under 
the assumed name of The Exchange, located at 39 Exchange Place. 
(R. 36 & 37) Thus, alternate claims were stated against these de-
fendants , and thereafter substantiated in opposition to defendants' 
verified motion to dismiss. Therefore, a motion to dismiss could 
not be granted where these alleged facts are presumed to be true. 
See Petersen v. Jones, infra. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The defendants' motion does not state with particularity 
that it is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but it must be assumed to be the case since that motion 
is the "usual and proper method of testing the legal sufficiency 
of the complaint." 2A Moore, Federal Practice 2266 (2d Ed. 1974). 
6 
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It is unclear from the record whether the trial court treated the 
defendants1 "motion to dismiss" solely as a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or as a motion for summary judgment under said Rule and 
under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) gives the 
trial court discretion to receive matters not contained in the plead-
ings and to treat it as a motion to dismiss or one for summary judg-
ment. 2A Moore, Federal Practice 2300 (2d Ed. 1974); Hill v. Grand 
Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970). Rule 12(b) 
states in part: 
Every defense, in law or in fact, to a claim 
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third party claim, 
shall be asserted in responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, . . . . If, on a motion asserting 
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall 
be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such motion 
by Rule 56. (Emphasis added.) 
The record makes no mention of a granting of summary 
judgment, but states, " . . . that Plaintifffs Complaint and causes 
of action . . . are hereby dismissed against . • . " the defendants, 
with 10 days to refile. (R. 17) The court neither expressly excluded 
nor included from its consideration affidavits and other materials 
7 
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submitted to the court which are outside of the pleadings. (See 
Minute Entry and Order of Court. (R. 14 & 17) The order of denial 
of the motion to reconsider makes mention of "evidence" having 
been presented to the court. Whether the court considered this 
evidence when it made its prior ruling is unknown. However, whether 
the court treated the defendants1 motion to dismiss solely under 
Rule 12(b)(6), or as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(b) 
and Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is moot because the 
court erred under either rule. 
A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under 
Rule 12(b)(6). 
If the court dismissed plaintiff's Complaint for failure 
to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), it clearly was in error. 
In Petersen v. Jones, 16 Utah 2d 121, 396 P.2d 748 (1964), the court 
states the well-settled rule: 
The motion to dismiss challenges only the 
sufficiency of the complaint, and as against 
such a motion, its allegations must be taken 
as true. 
On appeal from a 12(b) motion to dismiss, the appellate court must 
accept plaintiff's allegations of fact as true, together with such 
reasonable inferences as may be drawn in plaintiff's favor. Murry 
v. City of Milford, Connecticut, 380 F.2d 468, 470 (CA. 2d 1967). 
This Court has stated in Stevens v. Colorado Fuel and Iron, 24 Utah 
2d 214, 469 P.2d 3, 4 (1970) that: 
8 
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A complaint does not fail to state a claim 
unless it appears to a certainty that plain-
tiff would be entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of the claim. 
The allegations of plaintiff's Complaint in the case at bar accepted 
as true, clearly state a claim against said defendants under Section 
14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or in quantum meruit as more 
specifically set forth under Point I, supra. 
Where the court exercises its discretion under Rule 12(b), 
excludes supplemental evidence, and does not treat a motion to dis-
miss as a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider only 
the pleadings, and may not consider affidavits or evidence outside 
the pleadings: Grand Opera Company v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp,, 235 F.2d 303, 307 (CA. 7th 1956); Williford v. People of 
California, 352 F.2d 474, 475 (9th Cir. 1965). In the present case, 
the record includes evidence outside the allegations contained in 
the pleadings. Defendants filed a verified motion to dismiss. Plain-
tiff prior to the hearing date served an affidavit opposing the mo-
tion. The trial court could not give credence to the defendants1 
verified motion over the allegations of the complaint without consi-
dering plaintiff's affidavit too. Cohen v. Cahill, 281 F.2d 879 
(9th Cir. 1960). If this is done, the trial court is required to 
proceed under the provisions of Rule 56. 
The trial court could not have given credence to the de-
fendants ' verified motion over the mere allegations of plaintiff's 
Complaint. In Chappell et al v. Goltsman et al, 186 F.2d 215, 218 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(5th Cir. 1950), the court held that the motion to dismiss turned 
into one for summary judgment where a motion was supported by affi-
davits which disputed the allegations of plaintiff's Complaint, 
The Chappell court stated: 
Rule 12(b) clearly permits a defendant to 
raise affirmative defenses in bar by a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim and vests the court with discretion 
to treat such a motion as one for summary 
judgment. But disputed issues of fact 
cannot be resolved by affidavits nor may 
affidavits be treated for purposes of a 
motion for summary judgment as proof con-
trary to well-pleaded facts in the complaint. 
(Emphasis Added.) 
Plaintiff's Complaint contains sufficient facts to state a claim 
and to raise issues when compared with the defendants' verified 
motion to dismiss. More so is the case when supplemental evidence 
introduced by plaintiff is considered together with the allegations 
of fact in plaintiff's Complaint. If this is done, however, the 
court must proceed under Rule 56. Nevertheless, if this court 
determines that the trial court looked only to the pleadings and 
granted defendants1 motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
it should find that the trial court erred because the allegations 
of the Complaint must be taken as true for purposes of such a 
motion. 
B. Summary Judgment Under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56. 
If it is found that outside matters were considered by 
the trial court, error was committed because a motion to dismiss 
was granted when genuine issues of material fact were raised by the 
10 
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pleadings and the outside matters contained in the record. (See 
Point III for issues raised.) If the trial court chose to consider 
the materials contained in the record, then Rule 56, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, must apply. Rule 12(b) states in part: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense num-
bered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall 
be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such motion 
by Rule 56. (Emphasis added.) 
The general rule is that if the court does not exclude outside mat-
ters, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment. The 
case of Erlich v. Glasner, 374 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1962), held 
that it was error to dismiss an amended complaint as to all defen-
dants upon filing of a motion to dismiss, where the trial court in 
its order stated that it had considered all written documents on 
file and where the trial court had not entered an order expressly 
excluding the affidavit filed in support of the motion. The appel-
late court went on to hold that the trial court was therefore re-
quired to treat the motion as one for summary judgment and was 
required to give all parties reasonable opportunity to submit all 
material facts pertinent to such motion made. 
As to the manner of submitting those facts, and the stan-
dard by which to test them, Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
states in part: 
11 
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The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
In Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935 (CA. 9th 1967), 
Cert. Denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968), the appellate court disregarded 
the label that the district court put upon its disposition and held 
that whenever outside matters are presented to the court and not 
excluded, the requirements of summary judgment rule must be met. 
Thus, if such matters are considered and on appeal it appears that 
there was a triable issue of fact, the judgment will be reversed. 
POINT III 
, THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT BEFORE THE 
COURT AND THEREFORE THIS CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The record contains outside matters, (R. 4, 5, 12, 13, 
29-37) which divulge numerous genuine issues of material fact that 
are triable. The trial court did not expressly exclude these out-
side matters, and therefore, Rule 56 requirements must be met. 
The issues include, but are not limited to, the following: 
1. Whether plaintiff contracted with defendants, or any 
of them, or the agent of any of them, prior to incorporation by 
the defendants of The Exchange Place Social Association. 
The affidavit of Ben Holbrook shows that two architects 
hired by Stanley S. Adams made contact with Holbrook Company and 
12 
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instructed plaintiff to commence work prior to the date that The 
Exchange Place Social Association was even incorporated. (R. 12) 
These facts show the formation of a contract with an individual, 
Stanley S. Adams, prior to incorporation of the alleged proper 
party. The certificate of assumed name, signed by Stanley S. Adams, 
(R. 34 & 35), tends to substantiate the fact that Mr. Adams was 
doing business in a capacity other than as an agent for a corpora-
tion. This is in direct opposition to paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of 
the verified motion to dismiss, (R. 4 & 5) and therefore genuine 
issues of material fact are raised. 
2. Whether the defendants, or any of them, did business 
as The Exchange prior to the aforesaid date of incorporation, and 
at the time the contract was entered into. 
The d/b/a certificate, (R. 36 & 37) shows that at least 
Stanley S. Adams may have been doing business as The Exchange prior 
to the date of incorporation of The Exchange Place Social Associa-
tion and was legally doing business as The Exchange on May 9, 1973, 
and thereafter. In fact, The Exchange Place Social Association was 
not legally doing business under any assumed name until December 2, 
1974, when a d/b/a certificate was filed with the Secretary of State. 
(R. 34 & 35) The filing of that certificate at such a date was an 
attempt by the defendants to cloud the matter and to insert a cor-
poration as a defendant where three individuals were in fact liable 
and had done business as The Exchange for a lengthy period of time 
as evidenced by the d/b/a certificate on file from May 9, 1973, until 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
I 
at least November 21, 1974. The foregoing is in opposition to para- I 
graphs 1 and 3 of the motion to dismiss, and therefore genuine issues 
of fact are raised, I 
3. Whether prior to the aforesaid date the defendants, 
or any of them, were associated together as a joint venture or I 
partnership. i 
The d/b/a certificate, (R. 37) lists the names of three 
people, the defendants named in this action, who are to do business I 
under the assumed name of The Exchange, which is not a corporation. 
It is true that only Stanley S. Adams signed the certificate, but I 
the question is raised as to whether the two other individuals were i 
doing business in a partnership along with Stanley S. Adams. This 
fact contradicts paragraphs 2 and 3 of the motion to dismiss, and I 
therefore raises genuine issues of material fact. 
4. Also at issue is the question of the relationship | 
between the defendants prior to the incorporation of The Exchange • 
Place Social Association, at which time plaintiff had already 
commenced work to improve the leasehold. I 
Nowhere in the record is it denied that the defendants, 
nor any one of them, had a leasehold interest in the real property | 
commonly known as 39 Exchange Place. The leasehold interest is i 
alleged in the Complaint, and through affidavit, it is indicated 
that the plaintiff visited the premises which Mr. Adams controlled 
or had some interest in prior to the time The Exchange Place Social 
Association was incorporated. (R. 12 & 13) The premises were lo- | 
14 
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cated at 39 Exchange Place, the address given for The Exchange, 
d/b/a Stanley S. Adams. (R. 36 & 37) Therefore, genuine issues 
of material fact are raised here. 
In light of these numerous material facts that are genu-
inely at issue, in order for the trial court to have granted summary 
judgment, it must have determined these facts in defendants1 favor. 
This it cannot do! 
Summary judgment is never used to determine 
what the facts are, but only to ascertain 
whether there are any material issues of 
fact in dispute. If there be any such dis-
puted issues of fact, they cannot be resolved 
by summary judgment . . . . Hill v. Grand 
Central, Inc., 25 U.2d 121, 477 P.2d 150, 
151 (1970). 
Moreover, in Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 
420, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (1966), this Court stated that a motion for 
summary judgment is "a harsh measure" and that for this reason 
an opposing party's contentions "must be considered in a light 
most advantageous to him and all doubts resolved in favor of 
permitting him to go to trial." 
The court clearly erred upon granting the defendants' 
motion where such issues clearly exist, and therefore the case 
should be reversed and remanded to trial for a determination 
on those issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's Complaint states a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. Plaintiff claims that the defendants are per-
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sonally liable for the reasonable value of materials and supplies 
furnished to property leased by them. Material issues of fact 
were raised by outside matter not excluded by the court. It would 
be unjust to permit the defendants to substitute a corporation in 
their stead after plaintiff commenced work so as to avoid personal 
responsibility for their contracts. This court should reverse 
the District Court's order for the reasons stated herein. 
DATED: May 21, 1975 
Respectfully submitted, 
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By F. Burton Howard 
By Charles C. Brown 
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